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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant seeks to overturn the lower Court's 
order corrunitting him to the Salt Lake County Jail. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
On the 12th day of January, 1976 an Order to 
Show Cause as to why probation should not be terminated 
and appellant committed to the Salt Lake County Jail issued. 
After a hearing on January 27, 1976, the Honorable Robert 
c. Gibson committed appellant to the Salt Lake County Jail. 
A Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus issued and was denied. 
From the denial this appeal is taken. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
granted. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant pleaded guilty to the crime of petty 
larceny in Salt Lake City Court on the 24th day of October, 
1974. He was sentenced to six months• imprisonment. Impo-
sition of the sentence was stayed and appellant was placed 
on probation for one year. On January 12, 1976 an Order to 
Show Cause as to why probation should not be terminated and 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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a committment issue; a hearing was held on January 27, 197, 
before the Honorable Robert C. Gibson, and it was deterrni:.;. 
that petitioner had violated his probation and he was orde" 
committed to the Salt Lake County Jail for six months. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PLACING THE APPEL-
LANT ON PROBATION FOR A PERIOD LONGER THAN 
APPELLANT COULD HAVE BEEN INCARCERATED AND. 
THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT LOST JURISDICTION 
OVER THE APPELLANT WHEN HE HAD SERVED SIX 
MONTHS OF HIS PROBATION--THE STATUTORY LIMIT 
FOR INCARCERATION FOR THE CRIME OF WHICH 
APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED. 
This issue is a novel one in this jurisdictioo. 
In almost all jurisdictions clear statutes exist which 
precisely define the limits placed on the judiciary by the 
legislature with respect to permissible lengths of proba-
tion. In those jurisdictions where such statutes do not 
exist, the determination of this issue has been a diffi-
cult one. Nevertheless, the weight of the case law indi-
cates that there is only one possible answer to the quesoc· 
when no maximum limit is placed by the legislature on the 
duration of probation, the limit is the miximum length of 
time for which a defendant could have been incarcerated. 
The Utah statute with respect to probation reads 
as follows: 
- 2 -
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"Upon a plea of guilty or conviction 
of any crime or offense, if it appears 
compatible with the public interest 
the court having jurisdiction may s~s­
pend the imposition or the execution 
of sentence and may place the defendant 
on probation for such period of time 
as the court may determine. 
'The court may subsequently increase 
or decrease the probation period, and 
may revoke or modify any condition of 
probation. (77-35-17 Utah Code Anno., 
1953)." 
As the statute is presently written no limit to 
the duration of probation appears on its face. Apparently 
the statute grants power to the judiciary to place appellant 
on probation for as long as the Court sees fit, even for the 
entire life of defendant, and to subsequently revoke pro-
bation and then impose a prison sentence, It is appellant's 
contention that such an interpretation of the statute is 
contrary to general principles of law and deprives defendant 
of important fundamental freedoms in an unconscionable manner. 
In Oklahoma the question was first raised in Ex Parte 
~' 29 Okla. Ct. App. 275, 233 P. 781 (1925). In that case 
the statute provided that a qualified defendant might be placed 
on probation and remain on probation provided that he was not 
later guilty of a violation of any law or condition of pro-
bation. Defendant had been sentenced to two years in prison, 
but imposition was stayed and defendant was placed on probation. 
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Three months after defendant had completed serving two yea:: 
of probation, the trial court revoked the order of probatir, 
and ordered defendant incarcerated. The Oklahoma Supreme 
Court disallowed the order: 
"It was certainly not the intention 
of the lawmakers to hold sentence over 
the head of the person paroled so long 
as he should live, but only during the 
pendency of the judgment. To hold 
otherwise would be contrary to the 
spirit and policy of the law. (233 P. 
at 782; emphasis added) 
Ex Parte Eaton, supra, has been followed in many 
other cases in that jurisdiction: Ex Parte King, 40 Okla. 
Ct. App. 21, 266 P. 511 (1928); Ex Parte Anderson, 47 Okla. 
Ct. App. 363, 288 P. 503 (1920); In re Workman, 74 Okla. 
Ct. App. 225 (1942); Ex Parte Miller, 88 Okla. Ct. App. 44: 
(1949); Ex Parte Bell, 57 Okla. Ct. App. 257, 47 P.2d 886 
(1935). 
Though the Oklahoma statute dealt with minors, 
that point was immaterial to the Court. It interpreted its 
statute by saying: "If there is any ambiguity, it should 
be resolved in favor of the person sentenced." (233 P. 
at 782). It was the Court's considered opinion that proba· 
tionary periods should not exceed statutory periods of 
incarceration unless the legislature affirmatively granted 
such a power to the judiciary in precise, defined terms. 
- 4 -
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In Kansas a statute gave the judiciary the alterna-
tive of choosing probation under certain conditions. The 
statute then went on to say i 
"Such judge may at any time, without 
notice to such persons, terminate such 
parole by simply directing execution 
to issue on the judgment." (Kansas Laws 
of 1909, c. 116, Sec. 2; emphasis added.) 
In In re Carroll, 91 Kan. 395, 137 P. 975 (1914), 
the Court recognized the apparent grant of absolute discre-
tion, yet the Court found it difficult to admit of such 
control by the judiciary. The case involved a misdemeanor 
punishable under statutory authority by no more than six 
months imprisonment. The Court argued strenuously that 
there had to be a limit to the Court •s discretion to place 
a defendant on probation for extended periods of times 
"Although the statute relating to 
paroles (probation) granted by police 
judges does not expressly declare a 
limit, one is doubtless contemplated, 
and, since provision is made for im-
prisonment for a fixed time, that should 
be regarded as the limit of time for 
the termination of a parole (probation) 
and the absolute discharge of the paroled 
person." (137 P. at 977; emphasis and 
parentheses added.) 
In re Carroll was followed by Simons v. Walston, 
123 Kan. 574, 255 P. 975 (1926). It was not until the 
~islature amended the statute some 33 years later that 
the Kansas court altered its position because the 
- 5 -
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amended portion provided for probat;..on of '...lp to twc "·e~:-; 
in the case of misdemeanors. Application of Young, 20~ , 
140, 439 p. 2d 142 (1968) • 
In Idaho, beginning with State v. ~i%elber~e: 
71 Id. 282, 230 P,2d 696 (195l), the Idaho Supreme Cc..:r: 
interpreted its 1947 probation stat:ite .,,.hich granted -r 
the trial court the right to place on probation ··:or s:.:~.-. 
time as it may prescribe." In spite o: such broad ar:C: :::· 
eral language, the Supre.'lle Court o: Idar.o has a.: so re:-.:s:: 
to grant such enormous power to t::e courts ·..-i ':l:out sc!:'.e 
legislative pronouncement. 
"The period of probation a..~d restrai.::t 
of ~"le liberty of the ::iefe!"lda::t exte:-.ded 
:er -:·..ro years, while t:-.e cri::ie •,.;hi.ch C.:::e 
de:e::dar:t was found gui..: t:::· of ccrr:ir.i tti::g 
was punishable by imprisc:-.;ner:t fer a ?erix 
of time :iot exceedi:lg six ::ic::-:.....~s ... ::ie Cc-.::: 
had the power to i=tpose a : :idqme:-. t a::d cr:e: 
of probation for a period cf six =c::ths. 
(230 P.2d at 701) 
73 Id. 474, 253 P.2d 794 (1953) a..~d . ..., State·:. Sa.":dc•:a~ 
92 Id. 853, 452 P.2d 350, (1969~. 
holding were disct!ssed bv ~':e ::::::r;...::.a s·.::;::re=€ :::::·.i=: as 
recently as six 
___ , 328 so. 2d 223 ,::ro· : 
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"There is validity to not allowing 
probation to extend beyond the period 
of maximum sentences. First, a penal 
statute must be strictly construed 
in favor of those against whom it 
would operatei and second, to infer 
that a court could extend probation 
beyond such a maximum permitted pun-
ishment would lead to unacceptable 
results. For although the period of 
probation imposed here was only one 
year beyond the maximum sentence, 
the absence of any limit raises the 
possibility that a Judge could direct 
many years of probation even for a 
misdemeanor, a concept which has 
the potential to inJect further dis-
parities into the corrective process." 
(328 So.2d at 223, emphasis added) 
The Florida Court is correct. However small the 
disparities might appear for those of us never incarcerated, 
they would not be so for those forced to endure them. Forum 
shopping, though often the cry of "wolf," is a real possi-
bility both for the defense seeking leniency as well as for 
the prosecution who might have a defendant on a minor charge 
but wish to keep him "out of circulation." 
The Florida case is all the more significant because 
of the history of its probation statute. It was originally 
drafted in 1943 and provided for probation to exceed the 
incarceration limit by two years, In 197 4 the statute was 
altered so as to contain no limits at all. The statute could 
have been construed so as to allow for a lenient and broad 
interpretation, but the court rejected that approach, Watts v. 
- 7 -
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In another recent case in Wyoming, Hicklin v. Sta. 
___ Wyo. 535 P.2d 743 (1976), the Court was qui~: 
concerned about the rights of a defendant and after a prolo: 
discussion of the problems, refused to grant such total dis-
cretion to the judiciary. 
"A person on probation is not serving a 
sentence but is in a status something 
less than imprisonment that follows upon 
suspension of sentence. It connotes an 
absence of the rigors of confinement in 
a penitentiary, but at the same time is 
a substitute for complete imprisonment. 
It is imposed only upon convicted criminals, 
and results in a considerable restriction 
upon their liberty as well as intrusions 
upon their private lives. Fundamentally, 
it is a device for achieving the same 
social goals furthered by the more con-
ventional penalty of society•s desire 
for retribution and deterrence and its 
hope for rehabilitation. It is a loss 
of a part of cherished liberty in that 
freedom of movement and activity is 
restricted; the criminal is constantly 
under surveillance, must report his acti-
vities on a regular basis, and is deprived 
of intoxicants. In this case, twelve 
restraints are placed upon indepen-
dence ••• A probationer is a convict 
without bars with a sword of threat 
hanging over his head, that for a devia-
tion the doors may be slammed shut on 
him. 
•we therefore conclude that probation is 
constructive confinement and the restraints 
of probation cannot exceed a period in 
excess of the maximum term of imprisonment 
authorized by the statute violated." 
(535 P.2d at 753; emphasis added) 
- 8 -
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The Wyoming Supreme Court was not persuaded by 
arguments that probation is some sort of humanitarian grace 
period, some wonderful chance to be free and be pardoned, 
some light tap on the hand. It is not! It is in fact a 
kind of incarceration. 
We are in fact discussing the restriction of a 
man's freedom, a penalty imposed on his conduct. Probation 
is not a gift. It is a better situation than the bars of 
a prison cell, but probation is also the restriction of fun-
damental freedoms. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the 
penal qualities of the probation sentence. Korernatsu v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 432, 63 S. Ct. 1124, 87 L. Ed. 1497 
(1943). 
" ••• incidents of probation emphasize 
that a probation order is •an author-
ized mode of mild and ambulatory pun-
ishment, the probation being intended 
as a reforming discipline. • 11 (319 U.S. 
at 435) 
See also Cooper v. United States, (5th Cir.), 
91 F.2d 195 (1937). In that case the Court goes on to say: 
"We do not agree with appellant's con-
tention that probation, like pardon, 
may be refused by the convicted person. 
The act vests a discretion in the Court, 
not a choice in the convict. 11 (91 F. 2d 
at 199, emphasis added) 
Probation cannot be looked at as anything less than 
a sentence of limited incarceration. Authority for sentencing 
- q -
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must come from the legislature. Hicklin v. State, supra· 
-· 
Affronti v. United States, 3SO U.S. 79, 76 S. Ct. 171, lOC 
L. Ed. 62 (19SS); Andrus v, Turner, (10th Cir.), 421 F.2d 
290 (1970); In re Gutierrez, 82 Ariz. 21, 307 P.2d 914, 
(19S7) cert. den. 3SS U.S. 17, 78 s. Ct. 79, 2 L. Ed. 2d2i 
State v. Perez, lS Ariz. App. 300, 488 P.2d SOS (1971); 
Pete v. State, Ala. 379 P.2d 62S (1963); Sta: 
v. Smith, 83 Okla. Ct. 188, 174 P,2d 932 (1946). 
Furthermore I a large body of law stands for the r 
position that probation can only exist if the legislature 
acts. Affronti v. United States, supra; People ex rel 
Lindauer v. O'Donnell, 37 Cal. App. 192, 174 P. 102 (19 
Williams v. State, 162 Ga. 327, 133 S.E. 843 (1926); ~ 
Eaton, supra; In re Hall, 100 Vt. 197, 136 A, 24 (1927); 
Pickman v. State, Fla. , lSS So. 2d 646 (1963 
---
State v. Duncan, Ore. , Sl4 p. 2d 1367 (1973). 
---- ---
On the basis of all the above case law, it is cle 
that in the absence of a statute clearly defining the ~ 
to which a court may go in imposing probation, a trial coi;; 
may not impose a probation sentence for a period longer th' 
the statutory period for incarceration. To the same affec: 
are several proposed criminal codes. 
The American Bar Association and several other 
groups have proposed model codes as suggestions for state 
Legislators in the area of probation. Groups such as t.~e 
- 10 -
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ABA have suggested statutes which allow courts to order pro-
bation for periods longer than the stipulated period for 
incarceration, ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice -
Standards Relating to Probation, On the other hand, the 
National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice, Standards 
and Goals (Corrections) §16.11 advises that probation not 
exceed the prescribed limits for incarceration. No uniform 
opinion on the subject is therefore apparent. States have 
chosen both types of statutes. With such disparity over an 
issue involving personal freedoms surely the courts ought to 
function with judicial restraint and allow the legislature 
to perform its proper function and make a determination of 
the pressures and philosophical questions involved in a forum 
best suited to that process. 
Secondly, the fact that many states have adopted 
one or the other of the proposed statutes or revised versions 
of these model codes cannot impute to the Utah Legislature 
a statute it has not adopted no matter what the national trend. 
More importantly, whatever the trend of other State Legislatures, 
certainly their considered and debated opinions should not 
influence courts to take upon themselves a legislative func-
tion by choosing one of the two alternative statutes. 
Thirdly, although the ABA certainly advocates a 
broader statute it does not advocate court adoption of its , 
'
1
'
0del statute. 
- 11 -
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"(al The legislature should authorize 
the sentencing court in every case 
to impose a sentence of probation." 
(Part I. General Principles. 1.1 Nature 
of sentence of probation, emphasis added) 
At the outset, the ABA recognizes the Legislatur: 
authority and prerogative in this area. The ABA is quick 
to acknowledge that courts must receive permission to im-
pose this sentence. 
To further emphasize this principle at (d) of the 
same provisions, the ABA states: 
"Neither supervision nor the power to 
revoke should be permitted to extend 
beyond a legislatively fixed time." 
(emphasis added) 
The ABA is not asking courts to do anything. It 
recommending quite strongly that Legislatures allow courts: 
function in this area and that Legislatures maintain a fir.r 
control over the subject, presumably to avoid abuse and en:. 
a proper functioning of the system with useful, practical, 
and equitable standards. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant petitions this Court to vacate the orde 
of incarceration entered by the lower Court on the 27th da: 
of January, 1976, and grant appellant• s Writ of Habeas cor: 
:~ t:l~ submitted, 
.. ~">/'4.r 11/2 -
o ert • McRae . . 1 ,, Attorney for Petitioner-Ap~--
370 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
- 12~-~~~~--------11 
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Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief to the 
office of the Attorney General, Utah State Capitol, Salt 
Lake City, UT 84114 this 3d day of September, 1976, postage 
prepaid. 
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